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Jurisdiction 
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a), (5). 
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review 
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's jury 
instruction defining intentional conduct for the crime of aggravated assault. 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness. Ostermiller v. Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43, % 14, 233 P.3d 489. 
Issue 2: Whether Mr. Hutchings' trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
Standard of Review: "As to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 'we 
review a lower court's purely factual findings for clear error, but review the application 
of the law to the facts for correctness.95' Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, U 9, 165 P.3d 
1195 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, % 13, 156 P.3d 739). 
Preservation: State v. Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 
342. 
Determinative Provisions 
All determinative provisions are at Addendum E. 
Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case concerns a physical altercation between Larry Hutchings and his 
girlfriend, Deborah Cuddeback. During the altercation Ms. Cuddeback's hand was 
broken, which provided the basis for the State to file charges against Mr. Hutchings for 
aggravated assault. (R. 272:15.) The State also charged Mr. Hutchings with aggravated 
burglary and criminal mischief. (R. 272:15.) 
The jury was instructed that it could find Mr. Hutchings guilty of aggravated 
assault if (i) he intended to assault Ms. Cuddeback and (ii) the assault resulted in serious 
bodily injury. (R. 253.) The jury was not instructed that it must find Mr. Hutchings 
intended the serious bodily injury. The jury convicted Mr. Hutchings of aggravated 
assault and criminal mischief, but not aggravated burglary. (R. 163; 271:219.) 
Mr. Hutchings was sentenced to a term of 1 to 15 years. (R. 229.) 
In a memorandum decision, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. 
Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 342. The court of appeals held 
that under Utah's aggravated assault statute, "[i]t is enough to satisfy the mens rea 
requirement if the defendant intends the act that results in serious bodily injury." Id. f^ 5. 
II. Statement of Facts 
When Mr. Hutchings came home on April 6, 2006, Ms. Cuddeback would not 
open the door, leading Mr. Hutchings eventually to kick in the door to retrieve his 
personal belongings. (R. 271:106, 113-14; 272:102.) A physical altercation followed. 
(R. 271:114.) During that altercation, Ms. Cuddeback's hand was broken. (R. 271:12.) 
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At trial, Mr. Hutchings did not dispute the physical altercation with 
Ms. Cuddeback, but maintained that (i) he was defending himself and (ii) Ms. Cuddeback 
had broken her hand while assaulting him. (R. 271:113-14.) Thus, the trial court's 
instruction concerning the elements of aggravated assault were critical. The instruction 
given by the trial court permitted the jury to convict Mr. Hutchings if it found that it was 
his "conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct" that resulted in the injury to 
Ms. Cuddeback's hand. (R. 253.) Because Mr. Hutchings did not dispute the alleged 
conduct, the only issue was whether during the altercation Mr. Hutchings intended 
serious bodily injury, something the jury was instructed that it need not find. (R. 253.) 
Both Mr. Hutchings and Ms. Cuddeback's version of events are consistent with 
Mr. Hutchings5 contention that he did not intend serious bodily injury. According to 
Mr. Hutchings, after Ms. Cuddeback refused to open the door and he kicked the door 
open, and Ms. Cuddeback attacked him by grabbing him around the neck and choking 
him until he pushed her off of him. (R. 271:113-14, 116.) Ms. Cuddeback then clawed 
his face with her fingers outstretched. (R. 271:117-18). After clawing his face, 
Ms. Cuddeback punched him in the head, something that left the bruise visible in the 
photos introduced at trial. (R. 271:120; State's Exhibit 12 attached at Addendum C.) 
According to Mr. Hutchings, Ms. Cuddeback injured her hand when she punched him in 
the head. (R. 271:121.) It was undisputed that Mr. Hutchings suffered injuries to his 
face, head, and neck during the altercation. (R. 271:10; Add. C.) 
According to Ms. Cuddeback, Mr. Hutchings tackled her to the floor and choked 
her. (R. 272:53.) Ms. Cuddeback admitted that she then scratched his face and dug her 
nails into his forehead. (R. 272:52, 54.) At that point, according to Ms. Cuddeback, 
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Mr. Hutchings threw her hand out of his way "because I was pushing him, trying to get 
him off me. And the nails must of hurt him. They were cutting him. He grabbed my 
wrist and threw my hand backwards." (R. 272:55.)* Ms. Cuddeback testified that the 
altercation ended when she asked, "what are you going to do, kill me?" (R. 272:56.) 
Mr. Hutchings then stopped, went to the freezer, and took out a pack of cigarettes. 
(R. 272:57.) He then proceeded to fix the broken doorframe by using Ms. Cuddeback's 
hiking boot. (R. 272:86.) At the time, neither of them knew her hand was broken, the 
only injury that could later support an aggravated assault charge. (R. 272:86.) 
After Ms. Cuddeback's testimony, the defense moved for directed verdict. 
(R. 271:75.) Trial counsel argued, "what is required in order to establish a prima facie 
case of [aggravated assault] is not only that the serious bodily injury was caused but that 
it was intentionally caused. And I would remind the court of the testimony of 
Ms. Cuddeback, which as I recall, appears to indicate that during the struggle she was 
scratching Mr. Hutchings5 face. And according to her testimony he grabbed her hand and 
flung it back consistent with somebody trying to get scratching off of their face. I would 
indicate to the court that that certainly does not in my view rise to the level of 
establishing a prima facie case of intentionally injuring the hand." (R. 271:76-77.) The 
trial court denied the motion and later instructed the jury that it need not find that 
Mr. Hutchings intended serious bodily injury. (R. 271:80; 253.) 
1
 (See also R. 272:85 (on cross-examination Ms. Cuddeback reiterated: "Q: And he flung 
your right hand, that's the injured hand? A: That would be because I was trying to push 
him off."); R. 271:38 (the doctor who treated Ms. Cuddeback testified: "She said that 
she'd been assaulted And as she attempted to scratch her assailant, he grabbed her 
arm and flung it backwards, hit a hard object, and she was afraid her hand was broken.").) 
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Summary of the Argument 
The trial court instructed the jury that aggravated assault does not require a 
specific intent to cause serious bodily injury, but instead requires only that the defendant 
intends an act that then results in serious bodily injury. The court of appeals agreed, 
citing a case involving a jury instruction for second degree murder—a general intent 
crime—not aggravated assault. State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044 n.l (Utah 1984). 
Both the court of appeals and trial court erred. The plain language of the 
aggravated assault statute requires that one "intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another." Utah Code Ann § 76-5-103(l)(a). This court three times has construed that 
language to require specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. In re Besendorfer, 568 
P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 1977) ("a specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury on the 
victim"); State v. Howell 554 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1976) ("specific intent to inflict 
serious bodily harm upon the victim"); State v. Peck, 542 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Utah 1975) 
(rejecting that aggravated assault requires only a simple assault that causes serious bodily 
injury). Thus, the jury instruction was plainly erroneous under existing law. 
And that error was prejudicial, whether viewed under plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel analysis. Mr. Hutchings stated that Ms. Cuddeback injured her 
hand while she was hitting him. Ms. Cuddeback stated that Mr. Hutchings injured her 
hand when he pushed her hand away from him to stop her from digging her fingernails 
into his face. Neither version of events supports the view that Mr. Hutchings intended 
serious bodily injury rather than, at most, intended an act that resulted in injury. Thus, 
there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Hutchings would not have been convicted of 
aggravated assault had the jury been properly instructed. This court should reverse. 
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Argument 
I. The Court of Appeals Erred in Holding That Aggravated Assault Is a 
General Intent Crime 
The trial court erred when it gave a jury instruction describing aggravated assault 
as requiring only that Mr. Hutchings intended an act that caused serious bodily injury, 
instead of as requiring that Mr. Hutchings have "intentionally cause[d] serious bodily 
injury to another," which is the language of the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a) 
(2005).2 The court of appeals then erred in rejecting Mr. Hutchings' argument 'that to be 
guilty of aggravated assault he must have intended to cause the serious bodily injury 
suffered by the victim, not simply the conduct that resulted in the serious bodily injury." 
State v. Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, H 5, 2009 Utah App. LEXIS 342. The aggravated 
assault statute, as well as this court's cases interpreting that statute, plainly requires a 
specific intent to cause serious bodily injury, not a general intent to act. 
The crime of aggravated assault contains two mens rea requirements. First, the 
defendant must "commit assault as defined in § 75-6-102." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103(l)(a). Section 75-6-102 defines "assault" as "an act, committed with unlawful force 
or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to another." IcL § 76-5-102. Because there is no prescribed mens rea for simple 
assault, a defendant's conduct may be intentional, knowing, or reckless. Id. Second, and 
most important here, to transform simple assault into aggravated assault the defendant 
"A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-
102 and he: (a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or (b) under 
circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (2005) (emphasis added). 
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must "intentionally cause serious bodily injury to another."3 Id § 76-5-103(l)(a). That 
language plainly requires the defendant specifically to intend serious bodily injury. 
In this case, the jury first was correctly instructed as to the elements of aggravated 
assault: "Intentionally or knowingly; Committed an assault on [Ms. Cuddeback]; and 
Intentionally caused serious bodily injury to her." (R. 186 (Add. B).) But the jury then 
was incorrectly instructed that "intentionally" does not require that Mr. Hutchings intend 
the result, i.e., serious bodily injury: "A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with 
intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." 
(R. 198 (Add. B)); Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, K 5 (emphasis added). The 
combination of these instructions permitted the jury to convict Mr. Hutchings of 
aggravated assault whether he merely intended to push Ms. Cuddeback's hand away from 
him or intended to cause serious bodily injury to Ms. Cuddeback5s hand. 
The court of appeals found no error in the jury instructions based upon the 
following analysis, which is quoted in its entirety: 
It is enough to satisfy the mens rea requirement if the 
defendant intends the act that results in serious bodily injury. 
See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044 n.l (Utah 1984) 
(upholding nearly identical instructions for intent). 
Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, ^ 5.4 There are a number of problems with the court of 
appeals' abrupt analysis. 
3
 Because it is undisputed that Mr. Hutchings did not use a dangerous weapon, this brief 
ignores the alternative definition of aggravated assault involving the use of a dangerous 
weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b). 
4
 For some reason, the court of appeals cites to the 2008 version of the Utah Code. 
Hutchings, 2009 UT App 330, f 4 & n.2. But the 2005 version applies, as the incident 
occurred in April 2006. (R. 271:106, 113.) The mistake is inconsequential because the 
relevant statutes did not change between 2005 and the 2010 Legislative Session. 
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The first problem is that Fontana upheld a jury instruction for second degree 
murder, not aggravated assault. 680 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah 1984). The jury instruction 
in Fontana stated that second degree murder can be based on three "alternative forms of 
conduct." Id. These alternatives included (i) knowingly or intentionally engaging in 
conduct that causes the death of another, (ii) acting with the intent to cause serious bodily 
injury and committing an act clearly dangerous to human life that results in the death of 
another, or (iii) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to a 
human life. Id. Thus, the jury instruction in Fontana described a crime that can be 
committed with a general intent to act in a manner that results in death.5 Conversely, 
aggravated assault requires a specific intent to cause serious bodily injury.6 
The second problem with the court of appeals' analysis is that it ignores entirely 
three cases in which this court has held that aggravated assault is a specific intent crime 
requiring that the defendant intend to cause serious bodily injury. In In re Besendorfer, 
this court held that aggravated assault requires proof that "the accused intentionally 
caused serious body injury, viz., that he had a specific intent to inflict serious bodily 
injury on the victim, and such injuries were, in fact, caused by the assault." 568 P.2d 
742, 744 (Utah 1977).7 In State v. Howell this court held that aggravated assault 
5
 Even today, "[cjriminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another, (b) intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes 
the death of another, and (c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, he engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to 
another and thereby causes the death of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1). 
6
 "A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-
102 and he . . . intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-103(l)(a). 
The aggravated assault statute in Besendorfer is identical to the statute at issue here. 
568 P.2d at 743-44. 
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"requires a specific intent to inflict serious bodily harm upon the victim." 554 P.2d 1326, 
1328 (Utah 1976).8 And in State v. Peck this court held that the trial court committed 
reversible error when, among other things, it instructed the jury that "a person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined above and he causes serious bodily 
injury to another." 542 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Utah 1975).9 After noting that the instruction 
omits the requirement that a defendant intend serious bodily injury, this court observed 
that the "instruction would have permitted a verdict of simple assault" rather than 
aggravated assault. Id That is precisely what the jury instructions permit here. 
Confirming the court of appeals' error, the Legislature in 2010 amended the 
aggravated assault statute to transform it from a specific intent crime into a general intent 
crime. Starting in November 2010, the statute requires only that a defendant act in a 
manner likely to cause serious bodily injury.10 If serious bodily injury in fact results, 
then the crime is a second-degree felony; but if no serious bodily injury results, the crime 
is only a third-degree felony. The bill explains that the amendment was necessary to 
"provide that commission of aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury is a 
second degree felony, regardless of whether the actor intended to cause serious bodily 
injury." Enrolled Copy of Senate Bill 10, 2010 General Session, at 1:18-20, attached as 
Addendum F. Were the court of appeals correct that "[i]t is enough to satisfy the mens 
8
 The aggravated assault statute in Howell is identical to the statute at issue here. 554 
P.2datl328. 
9
 The aggravated assault statute in Peck is identical to the statute at issue here. 542 P.2d 
at 1084. 
10
 "A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and uses: (a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-103(1 )(a) (2010). 
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A. The Error in the Jury Instructions Should Have Been Obvious to the 
Trial Court and Trial Counsel 
As demonstrated above, the plain language of the aggravated assault statute 
required the jury to find that Mr. Hutchings intended to cause serious bodily injury to 
Ms. Cuddeback's hand. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(a) ("A person commits 
aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he... 
intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another."). Under Utah law, an error is 
obvious when 4Cthe law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was 
made." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, % 16, 95 P.3d 276. Here, no fewer than three cases 
decided by this court interpret section 76-5-103(1) to require a specific intent to cause 
serious bodily injury. In re Besendorfer, 568 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah 1977) ("a specific 
intent to inflict serious bodily injury on the victim"); State v. Howell 554 P.2d 1326, 
1328 (Utah 1976) ("specific intent to inflict serious bodily harm upon the victim"); State 
v. Peck, 542 P.2d 1084, 1085 (Utah 1975) (rejecting that aggravated assault requires only 
a simple assault that causes serious bodily injury). Therefore, the error was obvious 
under the law governing at the time the error was made in September 2007. 
For the same reason, constitutionally effective counsel would have objected to a 
jury instruction that expanded the definition of "aggravated assault" to include a mere 
intent to act instead of an intent to cause serious bodily injury. The erroneous instruction 
freed the State from proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt, namely 
that Mr. Hutchings intended to cause serious injury to Ms. Cuddeback. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-501. Here, trial counsel's error was particularly puzzling in light of the fact that 
he moved for directed verdict on the ground that there was no evidence that 
Mr. Hutchings specifically intended serious bodily injury to Ms. Cuddeback. (R. 271:76-
11 
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Similarly, counsel's deficient performance is prejudicial when 'there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable 
doubt respecting guilt." State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, «|| 86,152 P.3d 321. "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the jury verdict." Id, 
Here, the error was prejudicial. Had the jury not been instructed that it could 
convict Mr. Hutchings of aggravated assault if it found that he intended an act that 
resulted in serious bodily injury, it likely would have concluded that the evidence does 
not support an aggravated assault conviction, especially beyond a reasonable doubt. 
While the jury clearly believed Ms. Cuddeback's version of events, her version supports 
only a finding that Mr. Hutchings intended an act that then caused serious bodily injury to 
her hand. According to Ms. Cuddeback, Mr. Hutchings took her hand and threw it back 
into a bookshelf in order to stop her from digging her fingernails into his face. 
The prosecutor then specifically told the jury in closing argument that an intent to 
act was sufficient for aggravated assault. Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury that 
Mr. Hutchings intentionally broke Ms. Cuddeback's hand "because he grabbed her hand 
and he threw it back behind her head" and therefore "intentionally caused the serious 
bodily injury." (R. 178). The prosecutor then reiterated that because Mr. Hutchings' 
actions were not accidental, they were intentional, and, therefore, Mr. Hutchings 
intentionally broke her hand. (R. 207). Coupled with the erroneous instruction and lack 
of any evidence that Mr. Hutchings intended serious bodily injury, the prosecutor's 
statements make it very likely that the jury convicted Mr. Hutchings of aggravated assault 
for his intent to engage in conduct, not to cause the result of serious bodily injury. The 
error was therefore prejudicial. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINCS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061902496 FS 
Judge: DENNIS M FUCHS 
Date: October 22, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: patd 
Prosecutor: PARKINSON, PATRICIA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LJUNGBERG, ROBIN K 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 16, 1965 
Video 
Tape Number: S42 Tape Count: 21746 
CHARGES 
2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/04/2007 Guilty 
3. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/04/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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Date: Oct 22, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
RUN CONSECTIVELY TO TIME NOW SERVING AT UTAH STATE PRISON 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
DEFENDANT GIVEN CREDIT FOR TIME SERVE ON COUNT 2 
MISCHIEF 
CRIMINAL 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 2 Fine: $10,000 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $8525.00 
Due: $18525.00 
Charge # 3 
Total Fine: $10000 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $8525.00 
Total Principal Due: $18525 
Plus Interest 
Attorney Fees Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: S L ATTORNEYS FEES S L COUNTY ATTORNEY 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
STATE HAS 60 DAYS TO PROVIDE ANY RESTITUTION INFO 
Dated t h i s 2L ^y ot Q^u^- . 20&Z. At/ 
•£•5'' **' 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS, ] 
Defendant, ; 
) JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
1 Case No. 061902496 FS 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
The Court, in its charge to the jury, gives the following instructions numbered one (1) through 
( /&) inclusive. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / / 
Before you can convict the defendant, LARRY HUTCHINGS, of the crime of 
Aggravated Assault, as charged in count II of the information, you must find from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. That on or about April 6, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant, LARRY 
HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback; and 
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily injury to her. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault as charged in count II of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of count II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ir 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct 
or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Larry Lewis Hutchings, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080681-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 13, 2009) 
2009 UT App 330 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 0619024 96 
The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
Attorneys: Ronald Fujino, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Ryan D. Tenney, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Thorne, and McHugh. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Larry Lewis Hutchings appeals his convictions for aggravated 
assault and criminal mischief. Hutchings raises multiple issues 
on appeal, challenging his convictions. With respect to all but 
one of those issues, Hutchings!s lawyer has filed an Anders 
brief, and Hutchings has filed a memorandum to supplement 
counsel's brief. See generally Anders v. California, 3 86 U.S. 
738 (1967) (describing the procedures that appointed counsel must 
follow when he believes his client!s claims on appeal are 
frivolous); State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169-70 (Utah 1981) 
(adopting Anders requirements "as an expression of the 
requirements of due process of law" under the Utah Constitution). 
Because our independent review convinces us that the issues 
identified by Hutchings*s counsel in the Anders brief (the Anders 
issues) are indeed frivolous, see generally State v. Romano, 2 9 
Utah 2d 237, 507 P.2d 1025, 1025 (1973) (defining "frivolous" as 
"having no basis in fact or law"), we do not consider those 
issues further. See Clayton, 63 9 P.2d at 170 (holding that an 
appellate court may grant a withdrawal and affirm a conviction if 
it unanimously determines that an appeal is wholly frivolous). 
Apart from the Anders issues, appellate counsel argues that 
the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on the culpable 
mental state required for aggravated assault and the definition 
of "intentional."1 "Whether a jury instruction correctly states 
the law presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness." State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, H 13, 193 P.3d 92. 
The jury instruction on aggravated assault provided, 
Before you can convict . . . HUTCHINGS 
. . . of Aggravated Assault, . . . you must 
find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, each and every one of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about April 6, 2006, in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, . . . HUTCHINGS; 
2. Intentionally or knowingly; 
3. Committed an assault on [his 
girlfriend]; and 
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury to her. 
We agree with the State that the jury instruction correctly 
listed the elements of aggravated assault, including the culpable 
mental states. 
Aggravated assault requires that a person commit "assault as 
defined in [Utah Code s]ection 76-5-102, and . . . intentionally 
cause [] serious bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-103(1)(a) (2008) (emphasis added).2 An "[a]ssault is . . . an 
act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes 
bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily 
injury to another." Id. § 76-5-102. Because the assault statute 
does not provide the culpable mental state required to support a 
Although Hutchings failed to object to these instructions 
in the trial court, he requests that we review them under the 
plain error doctrine. The State does not contest our review of 
these issues. 
2Because it is irrelevant to this appeal, we need not 
address the alternative element of aggravated assault, that is, 
the use of a dangerous weapon or other means likely to produce 
death in the commission of the assault, see Utah Code Ann. §76-
5-103(1) (b) (2008) . 
onoonco1.pa 2 
conviction, "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to 
establish criminal responsibility." Id. § 76-2-102. To be 
liable for aggravated assault, however, the defendant must also 
have intentionally caused serious bodily injury. See id. § 76-5-
103(1) (a) . Thus, there are actually two mens rea requirements 
that must be met to convict a defendant of aggravated assault: 
the first is the intent, knowledge, or recklessness included in a 
simple assault charge; the second is the requirement that the 
defendant intentionally cause serious bodily injury. The 
challenged jury instruction correctly identified each of these 
mental state requirements.3 Accordingly, we reject counsel's 
claim that the jury instruction was erroneous.4 
Finally, Hutchings challenges the instruction to the jury 
that defined "intentional" conduct. That instruction stated, "A 
person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Hutchings 
argues that to be guilty of aggravated assault he must have 
intended to cause the serious bodily injury suffered by the 
victim, not simply the conduct that resulted in the serious 
bodily injury. We disagree. It is enough to satisfy the mens 
rea requirement if the defendant intends the act that results in 
serious bodily injury. See State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1044 
n.l (Utah 1984) (upholding nearly identical instructions for 
intent). 
Because counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders 
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and because we confirm that 
the Anders issues are frivolous, we grant counsel's request to 
withdraw with respect to the Anders issues only and affirm the 
trial court's rulings with respect to those issues. In addition, 
the jury instructions properly informed the jury of the elements 
3Indeed, by not including recklessness as a basis for a 
finding of assault, the State was held to a higher standard of 
proof for that mens rea element than required by the statute. 
4Because we conclude that the jury instruction was proper, 
we need not address Hutchings's claim that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer failed to 
object to the instruction. 
20080681-CA 1 
of aggravated assault, including the mental states required. 
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART 1. CULPABILITY GENERALLY 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2005) 
§ 76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liability 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and when the definition of the 
offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute 
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the 
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-102; 1983, ch. 90, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
± 
Depraved indifference. 
Jury instructions. 
± 
Relation to other sections. 
± 
Cited. 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE. 
In a prosecution for second degree murder, although the court's jury instruction did not expressly treat the 
element of knowledge, there was no error since the other jury instructions and the evidence of the defendant's 
actions left little room for the jury to misunderstand that the defendant must have been aware that his conduct 
created a grave risk of death to another, within the definitions contained in the instructions. State v. Fontana, 680 
P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
Requisite state of mind for a violation of the Utah Bail Bond Recovery Act, Utah Code Ann. 5 53-11-107r is intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness; therefore, a trial court properly instructed the jury on the required mental state because 
it was not classified as a strict liability crime. State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 88, 67 P.3d 1050. 
RELATION TO OTHER SECTIONS. 
In light of this section and § 32A-12-104, under § 32A-12-203(1), if a person recklessly provides alcohol to a 
minor, that person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; however,under § 32A-12-203(2) if a person knowingly 
provides alcohol to a minor that person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. State v. Valdez, 933 P.2d 400 (Utah Ct. 
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TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2005) 
§ 76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial 
risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 , enacted by L. 1974, ch. 32, § 38; 1989, ch. 51 , § 1; 1991, ch. 75, § 3; 1995, ch. 
291, § 4; 1996, ch. 140, § 1; 2000, ch. 170, § 2; 2003, ch. 109, § 1. 
NOTES: REPEALS AND REENACTMENTS. -Laws 1974, ch. 32, § 38 repealed former § 76-5-102, as enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-102, relating to assault, and enacted present § 76-5-102. 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added the Subsection (3)(a) designation, 
added Subsection (3)(b), and made two related changes. 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, added "bodily injury to another" in Subsection ( l )(c). 
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Bus hijacking, assault with intent to commit, § 76-10-1504. 
Power of city to prohibit assault and battery, § 10-8-47. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
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TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 5. OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 
PART 1. ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2005) 
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection ( l ) ( a ) , uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection ( l ) ( a ) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection ( l ) ( b ) is a third degree felony. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 1989, ch. 170, § 2; 
1995, ch. 291, § 5. 
NOTES: CROSS-REFERENCES. - A t t e m p t , § 76-4-101. 
Possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to assault, § 76-10-507. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Dangerous weapon. 
± 
Defense of habitation. 
Evidence. 
— Sufficient. 
Included offense. 
Indictment or information. 
± 
Instructions. 
± 
— Citizen's arrest. 
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8 LONG TITLE 
9 General Description: 
10 This bill modifies provisions of the Criminal Code regarding elements of specified 
11 criminal offenses and regarding the dollar value of damage used to determine levels of 
12 criminal offenses. 
13 Highlighted Provisions: 
14 This bill: 
15 • applies the enhanced penalty that currently applies to persons committing a crime 
16 in concert with two or more persons to persons who commit any of the listed 
17 offenses in association with a criminal street gang; 
18 • provides that commission of aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury is 
19 a second degree felony, regardless of whether the actor intended to cause serious 
20 bodily injury; 
21 • modifies the penalty for a second offense of theft, or of robbery or burglary with the 
22 intent to commit theft, to require that the second offense be committed or the 
23 conviction obtained within 10 years prior to the current theft offense; 
24 • modifies the factors considered by the juvenile court in hearings to certify a 
15 juvenile to stand trial as an adult to include if the juvenile engaged in criminal 
16 activity in association with a criminal street gang; 
11 • modifies the definition of a criminal nuisance to include criminal activity 
18 conducted in association with a criminal street gang; and 
19 • modifies the dollar value of damage that determines the levels of offense for 
S.B. 10 
CRIMINAL OFFENSE PENALTIES 
AMENDMENTS 
2010 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Chief Sponsor: Jon J. Greiner 
House Sponsor: Curtis Oda 
S.B. 10 Enrolled Copy 
30 offenses, including arson, criminal mischief, theft, various fraud offenses, unlawful dealing by 
31 a fiduciary, destruction of livestock, reckless burning, computer crimes, bad checks, mortgage 
32 fraud, and theft of utility services. 
33 Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
34 None 
35 Other Special Clauses: 
36 This bill provides an effective date of November 1, 2010. 
37 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
38 AMENDS: 
39 9-4-612, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2007, Chapter 322 
40 63M-7-510, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 339 and renumbered and 
41 amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 382 
42 76-3-203.1, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 157 
43 76-5-103, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 291 
44 76-6-101, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 320 
45 76-6-102, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2004, Chapter 134 
46 76-6-104, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1998, Chapter 71 
47 76-6-106, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2002, Chapter 166 
48 76-6-111, as enacted by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 282 
49 76-6-409.3, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 291 
50 76-6-412, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1997, Chapters 119 and 289 
51 76-6-505, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2007, Chapter 306 
52 76-6-506.5, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 166 
53 76-6-513, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 382 
54 76-6-518, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 291 
55 76-6-608, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2003, Chapter 173 
56 76-6-703, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2005, Chapter 72 
57 76-6-1204, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 211 
Enrolled Copy S.B. 10 
58 76-8-1206, as last amended by Laws of Utah 1995, Chapter 291 
59 76-8-1301, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 305 
60 76-10-1801, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 211 
61 78A-6-703, as renumbered and amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 3 
62 78B-6-1101, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2009, Chapter 21 
63 78B-6-1107, as renumbered and amended by Laws of Utah 2008, Chapter 3 
64 
65 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
66 Section 1. Section 9-4-612 is amended to read: 
67 9-4-612. Penalties for fraudulently obtaining or continuing to receive housing 
68 assistance benefits. 
69 (1) No person may knowingly, by misrepresentation, impersonation, or any other 
70 fraudulent means, make any false statement to housing authority personnel or, after being 
71 accepted as a recipient of housing authority benefits, fail to disclose to housing authority 
72 personnel any: 
73 (a) change in household composition; 
74 (b) employment change; 
75 (c) change in marital status; 
76 (d) receipt of any other monetary assistance; 
77 (e) receipt of in-kind gifts; or 
78 (f) any other material fact or change in circumstances which would affect the 
79 determination of that person's eligibility to receive housing assistance benefits, or would affect 
80 the amount of benefits for which he is eligible. 
81 (2) No person may fail to disclose any of the information described in Subsection (1) 
82 for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive funds or other housing assistance benefits 
83 to which he is not entitled, or in an amount larger than that to which he is entitled. 
84 (3) No person who has duties relating to the administration of any housing authority 
85 program may fraudulently misappropriate any funds or other assistance with which he has 
S.B. 10 Enrolled Copy 
86 been entrusted, or of which he has gained possession by virtue of his position. 
87 (4) No person may knowingly: 
88 (a) file or falsify any claim, report, or document required by state or federal law, or 
89 provider agreement, to obtain or attempt to obtain unauthorized housing assistance benefits 
90 under this chapter; or 
91 (b) attempt to commit, or aid or abet the commission of, any act prohibited by this 
92 section. 
93 (5) The punishment for violation of any provision of this section by a housing 
94 assistance recipient is determined by the cumulative value of the funds or other benefits he 
95 received from all the frauds he committed, and not by each separate instance of fraud. 
96 (6) The punishment for the offenses of this section are: 
97 (a) a [felony of the] second degree felony if the value of the funds or other benefits 
98 received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is equal to or exceeds $5,000; 
99 (b) a [felony of the] third degree felony if the value of the funds or other benefits 
100 received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is equal to or greater than [$1,000] $L500 
101 but less than $5,000; 
102 (c) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the funds or other benefits received, 
103 misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is equal to or greater than [$300] $500 but less than 
104 [$*reee] $1,500: or 
105 (d) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the funds or other benefits received, 
106 misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is less than [$300] $500. 
107 Section 2. Section 63M-7-510 is amended to read: 
108 63M-7-510. Ineligible persons — Fraudulent claims « Penalties. 
109 (1) The following individuals are not eligible to receive an award of reparations: 
[10 (a) persons who do not meet all of the provisions set forth in Section 63M-7-509; 
111 (b) the offender; 
12 (c) an accomplice of the offender; 
13 (d) any person whose receipt of an award would unjustly benefit the offender, 
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114 accomplice, or other person reasonably suspected of participating in the offense; 
115 (e) the victim of a motor vehicle injury who was the owner or operator of the motor 
[16 vehicle and was not at the time of the injury in compliance with the state motor vehicle 
117 insurance laws; 
18 (f) any convicted offender serving a sentence of imprisonment in any prison or jail or 
19 residing in any other correctional facility; 
20 (g) all persons who are on probation or parole if the circumstances surrounding the 
21 offense of which they are victims constitute a violation of their parole or probation; and 
22 (h) any person whose injuries are the result of criminally injurious conduct which 
23 occurred in a prison, jail, or any other correctional facility while the person was serving a 
24 sentence of imprisonment. 
25 (2) A person who knowingly submits a fraudulent claim for reparations or who 
26 knowingly misrepresents material facts in making a claim, and who receives an award based 
27 on that claim, is guilty of an offense, based on the following award amounts: 
28 (a) for value under [$300] $500, a class B misdemeanor; 
29 (b) for value equal to or greater than [$306] $500, but less than [$1,000] $1,500, a 
30 class A misdemeanor; 
31 (c) for value equal to or greater than [$1,000] $1,500, but less than $5,000, a third 
32 degree felony; and 
33 (d) for value equal to or greater than $5,000, a second degree felony. 
34 (3) A person who submits a claim described in Subsection (2) but receives no award 
55 based on that claim is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
56 (4) The state attorney general may prosecute violations under this section or may make 
57 arrangements with county attorneys for the prosecution of violations under this section when 
58 the attorney general cannot conveniently prosecute. 
(9 (5) The state may also bring a civil action against a claimant who receives reparation 
\0 payments that are later found to be unjustified and who does not return to the Crime Victim 
1 Reparations Fund the unjustified amount. 
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142 Section 3. Section 76-3-203.1 is amended to read: 
143 76-3-203.1. Offenses committed in concert with two or more persons or in 
144 relation to a criminal street gang — Notice — Enhanced penalties. 
145 (1) As used in this section: 
146 (a) "Criminal street gang" has the same definition as in Section 76-9-802. 
147 (b) "In concert with two or more persons" means: 
148 (i) the defendant was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing 
149 the offense and was aware of this aid or encouragement; and 
150 (ii) each of the other persons: 
151 (A) was physically present; or 
152 (B) participated as a party to any offense listed in Subsection (5). 
153 (c) "In concert with two or more persons" means, regarding intent: 
154 (i) other persons participating as parties need not have the intent to engage in the same 
155 offense or degree of offense as the defendant; and 
156 (ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause the minor to be a party if the 
157 minor were an adult. 
158 [(1) (a)] (2) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection [(4)] £5} is subject 
159 to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided in Subsection [{3}] (4) if the trier of fact 
160 finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the person acted; 
161 (a) in concert with two or more persons [?]; 
162 [(b) "hi concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means the defendant 
was aided or encouraged by at least two other persons in committing the offense and was 
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[70 [(ii) a minor is a party if the minor's actions would cause him to be a party if he were 
171 an adult.] 
172 (b) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang 
.73 as defined in Section 76-9-802; or 
.74 (c) to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or increased status with a criminal 
75 street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802. 
76 [(2)] £3} The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, shall 
77 cause to be subscribed upon the information or indictment notice that the defendant is subject 
78 to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. 
79 [(3)] £4} The enhanced penalty for a: 
80 (a) class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor; 
81 (b) class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony; 
82 (c) third degree felony is a second degree felony; 
83 (d) second degree felony is a first degree felony; and 
84 (e) first degree felony is an indeterminate prison term of not less than five years in 
85 addition to the statutory minimum prison term for the offense, and which may be for life. 
86 [(4)] £51 Offenses referred to in Subsection Ri)] £2} are: 
87 (a) any criminal violation of [Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c, regarding 
88 drug-related offenses;] the following chapters of Title 58: 
89 (i) Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act: 
90 (ii) Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act; 
91 (iii) Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act: or 
92 (iv) Chapter 37c, Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act; 
93 (b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1, Assault and Related 
94 Offenses; 
95 (c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2, Criminal 
96 Homicide; 
97 (d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3, Kidnapping, 
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198 Trafficking, and Smuggling; 
199 (e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses; 
200 (f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3; 
201 (g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1, Property 
202 Destruction; 
203 (h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 2, 
204 Burglary and Criminal Trespass; 
205 (i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, Robbery; 
206 (j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4, Theft, or Part 6, Retail 
207 Theft; 
208 (k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections 76-6-504, 
209 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 76-6-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 
210 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and 76-6-520; 
211 (1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 3, 
212 except Sections'76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307, 76-8-308, and 76-8-312; 
213 (m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508; 
214 (n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in Section 76-8-509; 
215 (o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3, Explosives; 
216 (p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons; 
217 (q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses under Title 76, 
218 Chapter 10, Part 12, Pornographic and Harmful Materials and Performances; 
219 (r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13, Prostitution; 
220 (s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety Act; 
221 (t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act; 
222 (u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801; 
223 (v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering and Currency 
224 Transaction Reporting Act; and 
225 (w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002. 
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126 [(5)] £6} It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the 
127 persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, 
128 apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted 
129 of a different or lesser offense. 
130 Section 4. Section 76-5-103 is amended to read: 
31 76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
32 (1) A person commits aggravated assault if [he] the person commits assault as defined 
33 in Section 76-5-102 and [he] uses: 
34 [(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or] 
35 [(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses] 
36 £a} a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
37 £b] other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
38 (2) £a} A violation of Subsection [(l)(a)] £1} is a [second] third degree felony, except 
39 under Subsection (DCoi). 
40 [f3)] (b} A violation of Subsection (l)[fb)] that results in serious bodily injury is a 
41 [third] second degree felony. 
42 Section 5. Section 76-6-101 is amended to read: 
43 76-6-101. Definitions. 
44 For purposes of this chapter: 
45 (1) "Property" means any form of real property or tangible personal property which is 
46 capable of being damaged or destroyed and includes a habitable structure. 
M (2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, trailer, railway car, aircraft, or 
48 watercraft used for lodging or assembling persons or conducting business whether a person is 
\9 actually present or not. 
50 (3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone other than the actor has a possessory or 
51 proprietary interest in any portion thereof. 
52 (4) "Value" means: 
)3 (a) The market value of the property, if totally destroyed, at the time and place of the 
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254 offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the market value; or 
255 (b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of repairing or replacing 
256 the property within a reasonable time following the offense. 
257 (5) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be ascertained by the criteria set 
258 forth in Subsections (4)(a) and (b), the property shall be considered to have a value less than 
259 [$306] $500. 
260 (6) "Fire" means a flame, heat source capable of combustion, or material capable of 
261 combustion that is caused, set, or maintained by a person for any purpose. 
262 Section 6. Section 76-6-102 is amended to read: 
263 76-6-102. Arson. 
264 (1) A person is guilty of arson ifA under circumstances not amounting to aggravated 
265 arson, [by means of fire or explosives,] the person by means of fire or explosives unlawfully 
266 and intentionally damages: 
267 (a) any property with intention of defrauding an insurer; or 
268 (b) the property of another. 
269 (2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
270 (3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is: 
271 (a) a second degree felony if: 
272 (i) the damage caused is or exceeds $5,000 in value; or 
273 (ii) as a proximate result of the fire or explosion, any person not a participant in the 
274 offense suffers serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
275 (b) a third degree felony if: 
276 (i) the damage caused is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000 in value; 
277 (ii) as a proximate result of the fire or explosion, any person not a participant in the 
278 offense suffers substantial bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
279 (iii) the fire or explosion endangers human life; 
280 (c) a class A misdemeanor if the damage caused is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less 
281 than [$1,000] $1,500 in value; and 
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182 (d) a class B misdemeanor if the damage caused is less than [$360] $500. 
183 Section 7. Section 76-6-104 is amended to read: 
184 76-6-104. Reckless burning. 
185 (1) A person is guilty of reckless burning if the person: 
186 (a) recklessly starts a fire or causes an explosion which endangers human life; 
187 (b) having started a fire, whether recklessly or not, and knowing that it is spreading 
188 and will endanger the life or property of another, either fails to take reasonable measures to put 
189 out or control the fire or fails to give a prompt fire alarm; 
190 (c) builds or maintains a fire without taking reasonable steps to remove all flammable 
191 materials surrounding the site of the fire as necessary to prevent the fire's spread or escape; or 
192 (d) damages the property of another by reckless use of fire or causing an explosion. 
193 (2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) or (b) is a class A misdemeanor. 
194 (b) A violation of Subsection (l)(c) is a class B misdemeanor. 
195 (c) A violation of Subsection (l)(d) is: 
96 (i) a class A misdemeanor if damage to property is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 in 
,97 value; 
,98 (ii) a class B misdemeanor if the damage to property is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is 
,99 less than [$1,000] $L500 in value; and 
00 (iii) a class C misdemeanor if the damage to property is or exceeds $150 but is less 
01 than [$300] $500 in value. 
02 (d) Any other violation under Subsection (l)(d) is an infraction. 
03 Section 8. Section 76-6-106 is amended to read: 
04 76-6-106. Criminal mischief. 
05 (1) As used in this section, "critical infrastructure" includes: 
06 (a) information and communication systems; 
07 (b) financial and banking systems; 
08 (c) transportation systems; 
09 (d) any public utility service, including the power, energy, and water supply systems; 
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310 (e) sewage and water treatment systems; 
311 (f) health care facilities as listed in Section 26-21-2, and emergency fire, medical, and 
312 law enforcement response systems; 
313 (g) public health facilities and systems; 
314 (h) food distribution systems; and 
315 (i) other government operations and services. 
316 (2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
317 (a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property with 
318 the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
319 (b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and as a result: 
320 (i) recklessly endangers: 
321 (A) human life; or 
322 (B) human health or safety; or 
323 (ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of any 
324 critical infrastructure; 
325 (c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or 
326 (d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or against a 
327 motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose, whether moving 
328 or standing. 
329 (3) (a) (i) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a third degree felony. 
$30 (ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor. 
531 (iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor. 
J32 (iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony. 
*33 (b) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(34 (i) second degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary 
135 loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in value; 
36 (ii) third degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary 
37 loss equal to or in excess of [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000 in value; 
Enrolled Copy S.B. 10 
338 (iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause 
339 pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of [$966] $566 but is less than [$1,666] $1,500 in value; 
340 and 
341 (iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause 
342 pecuniary loss less than [$300] $500 in value. 
543 (4) In determining the value of damages under this section, or for computer crimes 
544 under Section 76-6-703, the value of any item, computer, computer network, computer 
545 property, computer services, software, or data includes the measurable value of the loss of use 
546 of the items and the measurable cost to replace or restore the items. 
547 (5) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order any person 
548 convicted of any violation of this section to reimburse any federal, state, or local unit of 
549 government, or any private business, organization, individual, or entity for all expenses 
550 incurred in responding to a violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), unless the court states on the 
!51 record the reasons why the reimbursement would be inappropriate. 
>52 Section 9. Section 76-6-111 is amended to read: 
153 76-6-111. Wanton destruction of livestock — Penalties — Seizure and disposition 
154 of property. 
>55 (1) As used in this section: 
56 (a) "Law enforcement officer" is as defined in Section 53-13-103. 
• 5 7 (b) "Livestock" means a domestic animal or fur bearer raised or kept for profit, 
58 including: 
59 (i) cattle; 
60 (ii) sheep; 
61 (iii) goats; 
62 (iv) swine; 
63 (v) horses; 
64 (vi) mules; 
65 (vii) poultry; and 
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366 (viii) domesticated elk as defined in Section 4-39-102. 
367 (2) Unless authorized by Section 4-25-4, 4-25-5, 4-25-14,4-39-401, or 18-1-3, a 
368 person is guilty of wanton destruction of livestock if that person: 
369 (a) injures, physically alters, releases, or causes the death of livestock; and 
370 (b) does so: 
371 (i) intentionally or knowingly; and 
372 (ii) without the permission of the owner of the livestock. 
373 (3) Wanton destruction of livestock is punishable as a: 
374 (a) class B misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the livestock is [$300] $500 or less; 
375 (b) class A misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the livestock is more than [$300] 
376 $500, but does not exceed [$1,000] $1,500: 
377 (c) third degree felony if the aggregate value of the livestock is more than [$1,000] 
378 $1,500, but does not exceed $5,000; and 
379 (d) second degree felony if the aggregate value of the livestock is more than $5,000. 
380 (4) A material, device, or vehicle used in violation of Subsection (2) is subject to 
381 forfeiture under the procedures and substantive protections established in Title 24, Chapter 1, 
382 Utah Uniform Forfeiture Procedures Act. 
383 (5) A peace officer may seize a material, device, or vehicle used in violation of 
384 Subsection (2): 
385 (a) upon notice and service of process issued by a court having jurisdiction over the 
386 property; or 
587 (b) without notice and service of process if: 
588 (i) the seizure is incident to an arrest under: 
589 (A) a search warrant; or 
190 (B) an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; 
191 (ii) the material, device, or vehicle has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of 
192 the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this section; or 
93 (iii) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used in 
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394 violation of Subsection (2). 
395 (6) (a) A material, device, or vehicle seized under this section is not repleviable but is 
396 in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the orders and 
397 decrees of a court or official having jurisdiction. 
398 (b) A peace officer who seizes a material, device, or vehicle under this section may: 
399 (i) place the property under seal; 
100 (ii) remove the property to a place designated by the warrant under which it was 
101 seized; or 
102 (iii) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate location for 
103 disposition in accordance with law. 
104 Section 10. Section 76-6-409.3 is amended to read: 
105 76-6-409.3. Theft of utility or cable television services -- Restitution -- Civil 
K)6 action for damages. 
107 (1) As used in this section: 
108 (a) "Cable television service" means any audio, video, or data service provided by a 
109 cable television company over its cable system facilities for payment, but does not include the 
U0 use of a satellite dish or antenna. 
HI (b) "Owner" includes any part-owner, joint owner, tenant in common, joint tenant, or 
U2 tenant by the entirety of the whole or a part of any building and the property on which it is 
H3 located. 
H4 (c) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, 
H5 association, or other legal entity. 
H6 (d) "Tenant or occupant" includes any person, including the owner, who occupies the 
H7 whole or part of any building, whether alone or with others. 
H8 (e) "Utility" means any public utility, municipally-owned utility, or cooperative utility 
U9 which provides electricity, gas, water, or sewer, or any combination of them, for sale to 
h20 consumers. 
•21 (2) A person is guilty of theft of a utility or cable television service if the person 
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422 commits any prohibited acts which make gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television 
423 available to a tenant or occupant, including himself, with intent to avoid due payment to the 
424 utility or cable television company. Any person aiding and abetting in these prohibited acts is 
425 a party to the offense under Section 76-2-202. Prohibited acts include: 
426 (a) connecting any tube, pipe, wire, cable, or other instrument with any meter, device, 
427 or other instrument used for conducting gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television in a 
428 manner as permits the use of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television without its 
429 passing through a meter or other instrument recording the usage for billing; 
430 (b) altering, injuring, or preventing the normal action of a meter, valve, stopcock, or 
431 other instrument used for measuring quantities of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service, or 
432 making or maintaining any modification or alteration to any device installed with the 
433 authorization of a cable television company for the purpose of intercepting or receiving any 
434 program or other service carried by the company which the person is not authorized by the 
435 company to receive; 
436 (c) reconnecting gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television connections or 
437 otherwise restoring service when one or more of those utilities or cable service have been 
438 lawfully disconnected or turned off by the provider of the utility or cable service; 
439 (d) intentionally breaking, defacing, or causing to be broken or defaced any seal, 
440 locking device, or other part of a metering device for recording usage of gas, electricity, water, 
141 or sewer service, or a security system for the recording device, or a cable television control 
142 device; 
M3 (e) removing a metering device designed to measure quantities of gas, electricity, 
144 water, or sewer service; 
45 (f) transferring from one location to another a metering device for measuring 
46 quantities of public utility services of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service; 
47 (g) changing the indicated consumption, jamming the measuring device, bypassing the 
48 meter or measuring device with a jumper so that it does not indicate use or registers use 
49 incorrectly, or otherwise obtaining quantities of gas, electricity, water, or sewer service from 
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150 the utility without their passing through a metering device for measuring quantities of 
[51 consumption for billing purposes; 
t52 (h) using a metering device belonging to the utility that has not been assigned to the 
L53 location and installed by the utility; 
1-54 (i) fabricating or using a device to pick or otherwise tamper with the locks used to 
1-55 deter utility service diversion, meter tampering, meter thefts, and unauthorized cable television 
1^56 service; 
157 (j) assisting or instructing any person in obtaining or attempting to obtain any cable 
1^ 58 television service without payment of all lawful compensation to the company providing the 
k59 service; 
6^0 (k) making or maintaining a connection or connections, whether physical, electrical, 
•61 mechanical, acoustical, or by other means, with any cables, wires, components, or other 
62 devices used for the distribution of cable television services without authority from the cable 
63 television company; or 
64 (1) possessing without authority any device or printed circuit board designed in whole 
65 or in part to receive any cable television programming or services offered for sale over a cable 
66 television system with the intent that the device or printed circuit be used for the reception of 
67 the cable television company's services without payment. For purposes of this subsection, 
68 device or printed circuit board does not include the use of a satellite dish or antenna. 
69 (3) The presence on property in the possession of a person of any device or alteration 
70 which permits the diversion or use of utility or cable service to avoid the registration of the use 
71 by or on a meter installed by the utility or to otherwise avoid the recording of use of the service 
72 for payment or otherwise avoid payment gives rise to an inference that the person in 
73 possession of the property installed the device or caused the alteration if: 
74 (a) the presence of the device or alteration can be attributed only to a deliberate act in 
75 furtherance of an intent to avoid payment for utility or cable television service; and 
76 (b) the person charged has received the direct benefit of the reduction of the cost of the 
77 utility or cable television service. 
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478 (4) A person who violates this section is guilty of the offense of theft of utility or cable 
479 television service. 
480 (a) In the case of theft of utility services, if the value of the gas, electricity, water, or 
481 sewer service: 
482 (i) is less than [$300] $500, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; 
483 (ii) is or exceeds [$306] $500 but is not more than [$1,000] $1,500. the offense is a 
484 class A misdemeanor; 
485 (iii) is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is not more than $5,000, the offense is a third 
486 degree felony; and 
487 (iv) is or exceeds $5,000 or if the offender has previously been convicted of a violation 
488 of this section, the offense is a second degree felony. 
489 (b) In the case of theft of cable television services, the penalties are prescribed in 
490 Section 76-6-412. 
491 (5) A person who violates this section shall make restitution to the utility or cable 
492 television company for the value of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable television service 
493 consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable expenses and costs incurred on 
494 account of the violation of this section. Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and 
495 costs for investigation, disconnection, reconnection, service calls, employee time, and 
496 equipment use. 
497 (6) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect the right of a utility or 
•98 cable television company to bring a civil action for redress for damages suffered as a result of 
199 the commission of any of the acts prohibited by this section. 
500 (7) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy otherwise 
501 available to a utility or cable television company. 
502 Section 11. Section 76-6-412 is amended to read: 
503 76-6-412. Theft - Classification of offenses - Action for treble damages. 
i04 (1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter [shall be] is punishable: 
!05 (a) as a second degree felony [of the second degree] if the: 
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506 (i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
507 (ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
>08 (iii) actor is a rmed wi th a dangerous weapon, as defined in Sect ion 7 6 - 1 - 6 0 1 , at the 
i09 t ime of the theft; or 
110 (iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
11 (b) as a third degree felony [of the third degree] if: 
12 (i) the value of the proper ty or services is or exceeds [$1,000] $1 ,500 but is less than 
13 $5,000; 
14 (ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of any of the offenses listed in this 
15 Subsect ion ( l ) (b)( i i ) , if each pr ior offense was commit ted within 10 years of the date of the 
16 current convict ion or the date of the offense upon which the current convict ion is based: 
17 £A} theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to commi t theft; [or] 
18 (B) any offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, Fraud; or 
19 (Q any attempt to commit any offense under Subsection (l)(b)(ii)(A) or (B). 
20 (iii) in a case not amount ing to a second-degree felony, the proper ty taken is a stallion, 
21 mare , colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox , bul l , calf, sheep, goat, mule , jack , j enny , swine, 
22 poultry, or a fur-bearing animal raised for commercia l purposes ; 
23 (c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the proper ty stolen is or exceeds [$300] 
24 $500 but is less than [$1,000] $1,500: or 
15 (d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less than [$360] 
>6 $500, 
YJ (2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or commits 
58 theft of property descr ibed in Subsect ion 76-6-412( l ) (b)( i i i ) , is civilly l iable for three t imes 
\9 the amount of actual damages , if any sustained by the plaintiff, and for costs of suit and 
»0 reasonable [attorneys'] at torney fees. 
1 Section 12, Sect ion 76-6-505 is amended to read: 
2 76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft - Presumption. 
3 (1) (a) Any person w h o issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for 
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534 the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, 
535 property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, 
536 knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of 
537 issuing a bad check or draft. 
538 (b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person who issues a check or draft for which 
539 payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would not be paid if 
540 he had no account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
541 (2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the 
542 purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, 
543 or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of 
544 which check or draft is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft 
545 if he fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused check or 
546 draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or draft's nonpayment. 
547 (3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
548 (a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within 
549 a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less than [$300] $500, the offense 
550 is a class B misdemeanor. 
551 (b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period 
552 not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than 
553 [$1,000] $L500, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
554 (c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period 
555 not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than 
556 $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third degree. 
557 (d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period 
558 not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second 
559 • degree felony. 
560 Section 13. Section 76-6-506.5 is amended to read: 
561 76-6-506.5. Financial transaction card offenses - Classification - Multiple 
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562 violations. 
563 (1) Any person found guilty of unlawful conduct described in Section 76-6-506.2 or 
564 76-6-506.6 is guilty of: 
565 (a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
566 sought to be obtained is less than [$300] $500; 
567 (b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
568 sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than [$1,000] $L500: 
>69 (c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
>70 attempted to be obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $L500 but is less than $5,000; and 
171 (d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
!72 attempted to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000. 
i73 (2) Multiple violations of Subsection 76-6-506.2(1), Section 76-6-506.6, and this 
»74 section may be aggregated into a single offense, and the degree of the offense is determined by 
• 7 5 the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or attempted to be obtained through 
•76 the multiple violations. 
77 (3) The court shall make appropriate findings in any prosecution under this section 
78 that the card holder did not commit the crime. 
79 Section 14. Section 76-6-513 is amended to read: 
80 76-6-513. Definitions — Unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary — Penalties. 
81 (1) As used in this section: 
82 (a) "Fiduciary" is as defined in Section 22-1-1. 
83 (b) "Financial institution" means "depository institution" and "trust company" as 
84 defined in Section 7-1-103. 
85 (c) "Governmental entity" is as defined in Section 63G-7-102. 
86 (d) "Person" does not include a financial institution whose fiduciary functions are 
87 supervised by the Department of Financial Institutions or a federal regulatory agency. 
88 (e) "Property" is as defined in Section 76-6-401. 
89 (f) "Public monies" is as defined in Section 76-8-401. 
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590 (2) A person is guilty of unlawfully dealing with property by a fiduciary if the person 
591 deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property of a 
592 governmental entity, public monies, or of a financial institution, in a manner which the person 
593 knows is a violation of the person's duty and which involves substantial risk of loss or 
594 detriment to the owner or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted. A 
595 violation of this Subsection (2) is punishable under Section 76-6-412. 
596 (3) (a) A person acting as a fiduciary is guilty of a violation of this subsection if, 
597 without permission of the owner of the property or some other person with authority to give 
598 permission, the person pledges as collateral for a personal loan, or as collateral for the benefit 
599 of some party, other than the owner or the person for whose benefit the property was entrusted, 
600 the property that has been entrusted to the fiduciary. 
601 (b) An offense under Subsection (3)(a) is punishable as: 
602 (i) a felony of the second degree if the value of the property wrongfully pledged is or 
603 exceeds $5,000; 
604 (ii) a felony of the third degree if the value of the property wrongfully pledged is or 
605 exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000; 
606 (iii) a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property is or exceeds [$300] $500, but 
607 is less than [$1,000] $1,500 or the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, robbery, 
608 burglary with intent to commit theft, or unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary; or 
609 (iv) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property is less than [$300] $500. 
610 Section 15. Section 76-6-518 is amended to read: 
611 76-6-518. Criminal simulation. 
612 (1) A person is guilty of criminal simulation if, with intent to defraud another: 
613 (a) he makes or alters an object in whole or in part so that it appears to have value 
614 because of age, antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship that it does not have; 
515 (b) he sells, passes, or otherwise utters an object so made or altered; 
516 (c) he possesses an object so made or altered with intent to sell, pass, or otherwise 
517 utter it; or 
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>18 (d) he authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as genuine or as different 
>19 from what it is. 
>20 (2) Criminal simulation is punishable as follows: 
• 2 1 (a) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is less than [$960] $500, the 
>22 offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
23 (b) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is 
24 less than [$1,000] $ L 5 0 0 , the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
25 (c) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 
26 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third degree. 
27 (d) If the value defrauded or intended to be defrauded is or exceeds $5,000, the offense 
28 is a felony of the second degree. 
29 Section 16. Section 76-6-608 is amended to read: 
30 76-6-608. Theft detection shielding devices prohibited — Penalties. 
31 (1) A person may not knowingly: 
32 (a) make or possess any container or device used for, intended for use for, or 
53 represented as having the purpose of shielding merchandise from any electronic or magnetic 
H theft alarm sensor, with the intent to commit a theft of merchandise; 
\5 (b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport, or otherwise transfer to another any 
)6 container or device intended for use for or represented as having the purpose of shielding 
\1 merchandise from any electronic or magnetic theft alarm sensor; 
18 (c) possess any tool or instrument designed to remove any theft detection device from 
S9 any merchandise, with the intent to use the tool or instrument to remove any theft detection 
•0 device from any merchandise without the permission of the merchant or the person owning or 
1 in possession of the merchandise; or 
2 (d) intentionally remove a theft detection device from merchandise prior to purchase 
3 and without the permission of the merchant. 
4 (2) (a) A violation of Subsection ( l ) (a) , (b), or (c) is a class A misdemeanor. 
5 (b) A violation of Subsection ( l ) (d) is a: 
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646 (i) class B misdemeanor if the value of the merchandise from which the theft detection 
647 device is removed is less than [$300] $500; or 
648 (ii) class A misdemeanor if the value of the merchandise from which the theft 
649 detection device is removed is or exceeds [$300] $500. 
650 (3) A violation of Subsection (1) is a separate offense from any offense listed in Title 
651 76, Chapter 6, Part 4, Theft, or Part 6, Retail Theft. 
652 (4) Criminal prosecutions under this section do not affect any person's right of civil 
653 action for redress for damages suffered as a result of any violation of this section. 
654 Section 17. Section 76-6-703 is amended to read: 
655 76-6-703. Computer crimes and penalties. 
656 (1) A person who without authorization gains or attempts to gain access to and alters, 
657 damages, destroys, discloses, or modifies any computer, computer network, computer 
658 property, computer system, computer program, computer data or software, and thereby causes 
659 damage to another, or obtains money, property, information, or a benefit for any person 
660 without legal right, is guilty of: 
661 (a) a class B misdemeanor when: 
662 (i) the damage caused or the value of the money, property, or benefit obtained or 
663 sought to be obtained is less than [$300] $500; or 
664 (ii) the information obtained is not confidential; 
665 (b) a class A misdemeanor when the damage caused or the value of the money, 
666 property, or benefit obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less 
667 than [$i^eO] $1.500; 
668 (c) a third degree felony when the damage caused or the value of the money, property, 
669 or benefit obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than 
670 $5,000; 
671 (d) a second degree felony when the damage caused or the value of the money, 
672 property, or benefit obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; or 
673 (e) a third degree felony when: 
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674 (i) the property or benefit obtained or sought to be obtained is a license or entitlement; 
575 (ii) the damage is to the license or entitlement of another person; or 
576 (iii) the information obtained is confidential; or 
577 (iv) in gaining access the person breaches or breaks through a security system. 
578 (2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a person who intentionally or 
579 knowingly and without authorization gains or attempts to gain access to a computer, computer 
580 network, computer property, or computer system under circumstances not otherwise 
581 constituting an offense under this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
582 (b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a retailer that uses an electronic product 
583 identification or tracking system, or other technology to identify, track, or price goods is not 
584 guilty of a violation of Subsection (2)(a) if the equipment designed to read the electronic 
)85 product identification or tracking system data and used by the retailer to identify, track, or 
)86 price goods is located within the retailer's location. 
)87 (3) A person who uses or knowingly allows another person to use any computer, 
)88 computer network, computer property, or computer system, program, or software to devise or 
>89 execute any artifice or scheme to defraud or to obtain money, property, services, or other 
>90 things of value by false pretenses, promises, or representations, is guilty of an offense based on 
>91 the value of the money, property, services, or things of value, in the degree set forth in 
>92 Subsection 76-10-1801(1). 
>93 (4) A person who intentionally or knowingly and without authorization, interferes with 
• 9 4 or interrupts computer services to another authorized to receive the services is guilty of a class 
95 A misdemeanor. 
96 (5) It is an affirmative defense to Subsections (1) and (2) that a person obtained access 
97 or attempted to obtain access in response to, and for the purpose of protecting against or 
98 investigating, a prior attempted or successful breach of security of a computer, computer 
99 network, computer property, computer system whose security the person is authorized or 
00 entitled to protect, and the access attempted or obtained was no greater than reasonably 
01 necessary for that purpose. 
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702 Section 18. Section 76-6-1204 is amended to read: 
703 76-6-1204, Classification of offense. 
704 (1) Notwithstanding any other administrative, civil, or criminal penalties, a person 
705 who violates Section 76-6-1203 is guilty of a: 
706 (a) class A misdemeanor when the value is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than 
707 [$1,000] $1,500; 
708 (b) third degree felony when the value is or exceeds [$1,000] $L500 but is less than 
709 $5,000; 
710 (c) second degree felony when the value is or exceeds $5,000; and 
711 (d) second degree felony when the object or purpose of the commission of an act of 
712 mortgage fraud is the obtaining of sensitive personal identifying information, regardless of the 
713 value. 
714 (2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) is measured 
715 by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by a 
716 violation of Section 76-6-1203, except as provided in Subsection (l)(d). 
717 (3) Each residential or commercial property transaction offense under this part 
718 constitutes a separate violation. 
719 Section 19. Section 76-8-1206 is amended to read: 
720 76-8-1206. Penalties for public assistance fraud. 
721 (1) The severity of the offense of public assistance fraud is classified in accordance 
722 with the value of payments, assistance, or other benefits received, misappropriated, claimed, or 
123 applied for as follows: 
J24 (a) second degree felony if the value is or exceeds $5,000; 
'25 (b) third degree felony if the value is or exceeds [$1,000] $L500 but is less than 
'26 $5,000; 
'27 (c) class A misdemeanor if the value is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than 
'28 [$±#00] $1.500: and 
F29 (d) class B misdemeanor if the value is less than [$360] $500. 
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130 (2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the value of an offense is calculated by aggregating 
131 the values of each instance of public assistance fraud committed by the defendant as part of 
132 the same facts and circumstances or a related series of facts and circumstances. 
133 (3) Incidents of trafficking in food stamps that occur within a six-month period, 
134 committed by an individual or coconspirators, are deemed to be a related series of facts and 
135 circumstances regardless of whether the transactions are conducted with a variety of unrelated 
^36 parties. 
3^7 Section 20. Section 76-8-1301 is amended to read: 
^38 76-8-1301. False statements regarding unemployment compensation — Penalties. 
^39 (1) (a) A person who makes a false statement or representation knowing it to be false 
^40 or knowingly fails to disclose a material fact, to obtain or increase a benefit or other payment 
HI under Title 35A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act, or under the Unemployment 
'42 Compensation Law of any state or of the federal government for any person is guilty of 
'43 unemployment insurance fraud. 
'44 (b) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is: 
'45 (i) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the money obtained or sought to be 
'46 obtained is less than [$300] $500; 
'47 (ii) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the money obtained or sought to be 
'48 obtained is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than [$1,000] $1,500; 
'49 (iii) a third degree felony when the value of the money obtained or sought to be 
'50 obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000; or 
'51 (iv) a second degree felony when the value of the money obtained or sought to be 
r52 obtained is or exceeds $5,000. 
r53 (c) The determination of the degree of an offense under Subsection (l)(b) shall be 
54 measured by the total value of all money obtained or sought to be obtained by the unlawful 
55 conduct. 
56 (2) (a) An officer or agent of an employing unit as defined in Section 35 A-4-202 or 
57 any other person who makes a false statement or representation knowing it to be false, or who 
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758 knowingly fails to disclose a material fact, to prevent or reduce the payment of unemployment 
759 compensation benefits to an individual entitled to those benefits, or to avoid becoming or 
760 remaining a subject employer or to avoid or reduce any contribution or other payment required 
761 from an employing unit under Title 35 A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act, or under the 
762 Unemployment Compensation Law of any state or of the federal government, or who willfully 
763 fails or refuses to make a contribution or other payment or to furnish any report required in 
764 Title 35A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act, or to produce or permit the inspection or 
765 copying of records as required under that chapter is guilty of unemployment insurance fraud. 
766 (b) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is: 
767 (i) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the money obtained or sought to be 
768 obtained is less than [$366] $500; 
769 (ii) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the money obtained or sought to be 
770 obtained is or exceeds [$306] $500 but is less than [$1,000] $1,500; 
771 (iii) a third degree felony when the value of the money obtained or sought to be 
772 obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000; or 
773 (iv) a second degree felony when the value of the money obtained or sought to be 
774 obtained is or exceeds $5,000. 
775 (3) (a) A person who willfully violates any provision of Title 35 A, Chapter 4, 
776 Employment Security Act, or any order made under that chapter, the violation of which is 
111 made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of that chapter, and for 
778 which a penalty is neither prescribed in that chapter nor provided by any other applicable 
79 statute is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
r80 (b) Each day a violation of Subsection (3)(a) continues shall be a separate offense. 
'81 (4) A person is guilty of a class C misdemeanor if: 
82 (a) as an employee of the Department of Workforce Services, in willful violation of 
83 Section 35A-4-312, the employee makes a disclosure of information obtained from an 
84 employing unit or individual in the administration of Title 35 A, Chapter 4, Employment 
85 Security Act; or 
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786 (b) the person has obtained a list of applicants for work or of claimants or recipients of 
787 benefits under Title 35A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act, and uses or permits the use of 
788 the list for any political purpose. 
789 Section 21. Section 76-10-1801 is amended to read: 
790 76-10-1801. Communications fraud « Elements - Penalties. 
9^1 (1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
r92 from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
f93 representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly 
r94 with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
r95 artifice is guilty of: 
96 (a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
97 sought to be obtained is less than r$300] $500: 
98 (b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
99 sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$300] $500 but is less than [$1,000] $1,500: 
00 (c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
01 sought to be obtained is or exceeds [$1,000] $1,500 but is less than $5,000; 
02 (d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
03 sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
04 (e) a second degree felony when the object or purpose of the scheme or artifice to 
05 defraud is the obtaining of sensitive personal identifying information, regardless of the value. 
06 (2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
07 measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained 
08 by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
09 (3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense 
10 described in Subsection (1). 
11 (4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) 
12 to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary 
13 element of the offense. 
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814 (5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a 
815 scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication 
816 fraud. 
817 (6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to: 
818 (i) bestow, convey, make known, recount, or impart; 
819 (ii) give by way of information; 
820 (iii) talk over; or 
821 (iv) transmit information. 
822 (b) Means of communication include use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, 
823 television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
824 (7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
825 representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
826 intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
827 (8) As used in this section, "sensitive personal identifying information" means 
828 information regarding an individual's: 
829 (a) Social Security number; 
830 (b) driver's license number or other government issued identification number; 
831 (c) financial account number or credit or debit card number; 
832 (d) password or personal identification number or other identification required to gain 
833 access to a financial account or a secure website; 
834 (e) automated or electronic signature; 
335 (f) unique biometric data; or 
336 (g) any other information that can be used to gain access to an individual's financial 
337 accounts or to obtain goods or services. 
$38 Section 22. Section 78A-6-703 is amended to read: 
539 78A-6-703. Certification hearings - Juvenile court to hold preliminary hearing 
?40 — Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to district court. 
541 (1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) alleges 
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!42 the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the 
(43 juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
!44 (2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its 
!45 case and the burden of establishing: 
146 (a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant 
147 committed it; and 
148 (b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests 
49 of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction. 
50 (3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor 
51 or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider, 
52 and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors: 
53 (a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community 
54 requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; 
55 (b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor under circumstances 
56 which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 if the minor 
57 were adult and the offense was committed: 
58 {i} in concert with two or more persons [under circumstances which would subject the 
59 minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult]; 
60 (ii) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street 
61 gang as defined in Section 76-9-802; or 
62 (iii) to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or increased status with a criminal 
63 street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802: 
64 (c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, 
65 or willful manner; 
56 (d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being 
57 given to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418; 
58 (e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of [his] the minor's 
59 home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
S.B. 10 Enrolled Copy 
870 (f) the record and previous history of the minor; 
871 (g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the 
872 juvenile court; 
873 (h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the 
874 minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the 
875 district court; 
876 (i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
877 (j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises as 
878 provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
879 (4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is 
880 discretionary with the court. 
881 (5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical, 
882 educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
883 (b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party, 
884 the court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to appear 
885 and be subject to both direct and cross-examination. 
886 (6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call 
887 witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by 
888 Subsection (3). 
889 (7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court may 
890 enter an order: 
891 (a) certifying that finding; and 
892 (b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
893 (8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by 
894 the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall 
395 proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in 
396 Subsection (2)(b). 
191 (9) The provisions of Section 78A-6-115, Section 78A-6-1 111, and other provisions 
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198 relating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this section to 
199 the extent they are pertinent. 
>00 (10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district 
K)l court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
>02 (11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same 
>03 right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile 
>04 court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, 
>05 Bail. 
>06 (12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or when a 
>07 criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a 
K)8 committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense described in Section 78A-6-702, 
K)9 the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
40 court over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the 
41 same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against [htm] 
42 the minor, except as provided in Subsection (14). 
43 (13) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on any 
44 other offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction 
45 over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
46 (14) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
47 Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
48 is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
49 Section 23. Section 78B-6-1101 is amended to read: 
>20 78B-6-1101. Definitions — Nuisance — Right of action. 
>21 (1) A nuisance is anything which is injurious to health, indecent, offensive to the 
'22 senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable 
>23 enjoyment of life or property. A nuisance may be the subject of an action. 
>24 (2) A nuisance may include the following: 
>25 (a) drug houses and drug dealing as provided in Section 78B-6-1107; 
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926 (b) gambling as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 11; 
927 (c) criminal activity committed in concert with two or more persons as provided in 
928 Section 76-3-203.1; 
929 (d) criminal activity committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association 
930 with any criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802; 
931 (e) criminal activity committed to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or 
932 increased status with a criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802: 
933 [(d)] (jQ party houses which frequently create conditions defined in Subsection (1); 
934 and 
935 [fc)] (g) prostitution as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13. 
936 (3) A nuisance under this part includes tobacco smoke that drifts into any residential 
937 unit a person rents, leases, or owns, from another residential or commercial unit and the 
938 smoke: 
939 (a) drifts in more than once in each of two or more consecutive seven-day periods; and 
940 (b) creates any of the conditions under Subsection (1). 
?41 (4) Subsection (3) does not apply to: 
942 (a) residential rental units available for temporary rental, such as for vacations, or 
?43 available for only 30 or fewer days at a time; or 
)44 (b) hotel or motel rooms. 
)45 (5) Subsection (3) does not apply to any unit that is part of a timeshare development, 
)46 as defined in Section 57-19-2, or subject to a timeshare interest as defined in Section 57-19-2. 
>47 (6) An action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected, or 
48 whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance. 
49 (7) "Agricultural operation" means any activity engaged in the commercial production 
50 of crops, orchards, aquaculture, livestock, poultry, livestock products, poultry products, and 
51 the facilities, equipment, and property used to facilitate the activity. 
52 (8) "Manufacturing facility" means any factory, plant, or other facility including its 
53 appurtenances, where the form of raw materials, processed materials, commodities, or other 
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54 physical objects is converted or otherwise changed into other materials, commodities, or 
55 physical objects or where such materials, commodities, or physical objects are combined to 
56 form a new material, commodity, or physical object. 
57 Section 24. Section 78B-6-1107 is amended to read: 
58 78B-6-1107. Nuisance - Right of action to abate nuisances - Drug houses and 
59 drug dealing - Gambling -- Criminal activity - Prostitution - Weapons. 
60 (1) Every building or place is a nuisance where: 
61 (a) the unlawful sale, manufacture, service, storage, distribution, dispensing, or 
62 acquisition occurs of any controlled substance, precursor, or analog specified in Title 58, 
63 Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; 
64 (b) gambling is permitted to be played, conducted, or dealt upon as prohibited in Title 
'65 76, Chapter 10, Part 11, Gambling, which creates the conditions of a nuisance as defined in 
'66 Subsection 78B-6-1101(1); 
67 (c) criminal activity is committed in concert with two or more persons as provided in 
'68 Section 76-3-203.1; 
69 (d) criminal activity is committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
70 association with any criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802; 
'71 (e) criminal activity is committed to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or 
72 increased status with a criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802; 
73 [(d)] (f! parties occur frequently which create the conditions of a nuisance as defined 
74 in Subsection 78B-6-1101(1); 
75 [(c)] {g} prostitution or promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one or 
76 more persons as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13, Prostitution; and 
77 [ff)] (h} a violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, occurs on the premises. 
78 (2) It is a defense to nuisance under Subsection (l)(a) if the defendant can prove that 
79 the defendant is lawfully entitled to possession of a controlled substance. 
80 (3) Sections 78B-6-1108 through 78B-6-1114 govern only an abatement by eviction 
81 of the nuisance as defined in Subsection (1). 
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982 Section 25. Effective date. 
983 This bill takes effect on November 1. 2010. 
